Bicameralism and the Logic of Party Organization

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Abstract
This paper takes a novel approach to the question of how bicameralism matters by asking not how it shapes policy outcomes, but rather how it shapes political parties. Bicameralism uniquely challenges political parties because party leaders have few tools for disciplining copartisans in separate legislative chambers. As long as party members do not share identical policy preferences, or strategic contexts across chambers differ, copartisan cohorts in each chamber are likely to favor distinct policy positions. To the extent that parties value clear, consistent party labels, it is in their best interest to find ways to keep intraparty disagreements out of the public eye. We argue that parties in bicameral systems do this by centralizing candidate selection, so that members in both chambers are accountable to the same master. We test our argument using data from 66 political parties in 11 advanced parliamentary democracies.

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How does bicameralism affect politics in developed democracies? The question for comparative political scientists long has been not "how" but "whether," and the literature's answer for the most part is that it does not. Asymmetry (when upper chambers are weak relative to lower chambers) and congruence (when upper chambers mirror the composition of their lower-chamber counterparts) are seen to render upper chambers as little more than minor irritants in the legislative process (Lijphart 1984; 1994). More nuanced treatments suggest that weakness need not imply impotence (Tsebelis and Money 1997), but bicameralism's substantive effects are conditional on coalition politics and interparty competition (Druckman, Martin, and Thies 2005; Druckman and Thies 2002; Heller 2001b; and cf. Rogers 2001). The core premise is that the effect of bicameralism depends on the degree of intercameral congruence.

Our analysis suggests a deeper, less visible effect. Bicameralism affects not only what parties do, but also how they make decisions and, by implication, what they want. We arrive at this conclusion by examining how bicameralism affects *intra*party rather than *inter*party politics. The core of our argument is that individuals use organizations to adapt to institutions over which they have little influence. Inasmuch as institutions differ, so too should adaptations to them; the trick to testing this argument is to identify both institutions that vary across cases and what kinds of adaptations they should motivate. We hone in on the number of legislative chambers as a straightforward and readily accessible example of constitutionally defined (and hence difficult to change) institutional variation.

The initial question is how bicameralism affects individual legislators' incentives to push for their own preferred policy positions, even at the risk of damaging their party labels. Our innovative approach applies the institutional logic of veto players (Tsebelis 2002) to intraparty

politics, where bicameralism provides a unique forum for different cohorts from the same party to take public stands on policy. The possibility that copartisans in different chambers might take distinct policy positions is a threat to the clarity and coherence of party labels. To counter that threat, parties need to ensure not only that their members in both chambers of bicameral legislatures toe the party line but—equally, if not more, important—that they toe the *same* party line. To this end, it behooves parties to find ways to make their members in both chambers accountable to a single principal.[1] The most straightforward way to do this is to centralize control over ballot access, so that legislators in either chamber who want to retain their seats must curry favor with the same leaders.[2]

We begin with the conventional wisdom that party unity is a collective good (Laver 2006), but that individual legislators sometimes might want to break ranks with their party (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Heller and Mershon 2008; cf. Kam 2009; Whiteley and Seyd 1999). This is especially problematic in bicameral legislatures, where a party whip cannot be extended across chambers (cf. Heller 2001b; 2007). Applying the finding that governing coalitions in bicameral parliamentary systems are better off when they internalize majority preferences in both chambers (Druckman, Martin, and Thies 2005; Druckman and Thies 2002) to legislative parties, themselves coalitions of individuals in separate caucuses in each chamber, suggests the need either to (1) internalize the preferences of copartisan groups in both chambers or (2) to ensure *ex ante* that neither chamber cohort has incentives to deviate from the party line. Centralized candidate selection addresses both needs, first by giving central party leaders control over ballot access and, hence, who sits in each chamber; and second, by making members of both chambers answerable to the same master.

To build and test our argument, we first briefly review the political science literature on how institutions structure decision making and discuss how structure affords influence to specific individuals or groups. In Section 2, we construct a model to show how extra-party (legislative or executive) offices can affect intraparty decision making. We argue that bicameralism is a special case of the situation we model and we build on the problems highlighted by the model to develop testable hypotheses concerning how parties in bicameral systems might seek to resolve them. In the following two sections we test our hypotheses using a measure of candidate-selection centralization for 66 parties in 11 Western European democracies from 1972 to 1990. The final section concludes.

1. Collective Action, Organization, and Decisions

Absent organization, collective action is difficult. Where individual goals differ from collective ones, people either will pursue their own goals to the detriment of the collectivity (Olson 1965, 53-57) or try to move collective goals toward their own, or both. Absent decision-making hierarchy, making any decisions, much less consistent ones, might be next to impossible (Cox 2006; Tsebelis 2002). There is, in short, a tradeoff between participation in decision making and the ability to make clear, consistent, timely decisions (see, e.g., Arrow 1951; McKelvey 1976; Shepsle and Bonchek 1997, 77; Weaver and Rockman 1993, 5-6).

In legislatures, parties help resolve the tension between participation and decisiveness. They compete for agenda-setting offices (Cox 2006), which they use to direct and constrain legislative activity (Cox and McCubbins 2001; 2005). Whatever parties control key legislative offices also control policy making. The collective dilemmas that parties solve for legislatures also plague intraparty (or intracoalition) decision making, however. A leader who seeks to establish as party policy a position that members reject risks revolt (Calvert 1987; and cf., e.g., Jones 1968) or defection (Heller and Mershon 2005; 2008; 2009), as Tony Blair discovered

when he had to count on opposition votes to pass a watered-down education bill (see, for instance, *Economist* 2006).

At its simplest, party policy making is a bargaining process in which leaders set policy unilaterally but their rank and file can punish them *ex post* if they stray beyond acceptable bounds (cf. Kam et al. 2010). Leadership preferences matter because leaders define party positions within the range of what their rank and file will accept, and different leaders can set different positions within the acceptable range. In this formulation, the process of establishing, maintaining, and implementing a party program fits in a principal-agent framework (see Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991), and the institutional game (wherein the agenda setter proposes policy that backbenchers can accept or reject) is nested within the principal-agent relationship (Tsebelis 1990; and cf. Cox 1987; Cox and McCubbins 1993).

What of parties whose leadership ranks comprise more than one person? Collective leadership implies that authority is diluted, whether through a process for establishing party positions by consensus (Cox and McKelvey 1984; Cox and Tutt 1984; Tsebelis 2002; and cf. Baylis 1989; Müller-Rommel 1988), or by giving each individual in the leadership unfettered authority over a relatively small policy area (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Laver and Shepsle 1996; 1999; Shepsle 1979). Where authority is thus distributed party policy is a package of leader ideal points on relevant dimensions (as constrained by the preferences of other party members; Heller 2001a).

If parties were to put non-leadership agents into legislative agenda-setting offices—or, more generally and in particular for parties in the opposition, to allow members not involved in party decision making to set public perceptions of the party—they would risk blurring the party label, as agents naturally would seek to stake out policy positions as close to their own preferred

positions as possible. They cannot credibly commit to anything else (cf. Laver and Shepsle 1996). As long as the party label is a valuable asset (see especially Clark 2009; see also, e.g., Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999a; Cox and McCubbins 1993; 1994; Popkin 1994; Raunio 1999; Snyder and Ting 2002), it is therefore in party leaders' interest directly to exercise their party's authority over legislative office when possible and to be very careful about whom they allow to do so otherwise (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). If the same people who define a party's formal platform through manifestos and leadership pronouncements also define its position through legislative action and speech day to day, there will be a close correspondence between the party's formal position and its policy performance in office.

Because bicameralism creates opportunities for party members in different chambers to take different public stands on party policy, it creates an obstacle to maintaining the clarity and coherence of party labels.[3] As long as a party's legislative caucus can influence the party-position aspects of the party label, it will move the position closer to its own preferences as possible. In technical terms, it will establish a position within its Pareto set, where any alternative would make at least on caucus member worse off (for applications of this reasoning and its behavioral implications, see, e.g., Cox and McCubbins 2005; Heller 2007). Absent a guarantee that the policy-space Pareto sets of a party's cohorts in both chambers will overlap, positions set by copartisans in different chambers could blur the party label (Heller 2007). Hence, if party labels are important (a common assumption; cf., e.g., Adams 2001; Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Alesina and Cukierman 1990; Cox and McCubbins 1994; 2005; Di Palma 1986; Katz 1986; Laver and Schofield 1990; Laver 2006; Popkin 1994; Shepsle 1972; Snyder and Ting 2002), parties need to induce their cohorts in each chamber to establish the same policy position on any

given issue.[4] We turn in the next section to a general exposition of this argument, of which bicameralism is a special case.

2. Shared Authority and Decision Outcomes

We proceed in two steps. First, we assume spatial preferences and show how moving from a single decision maker to two who act jointly can affect decisions. The conclusion that rules affect decisions even where unity appears strong is essentially a strong form of the claim that "institutions matter." Second, we flesh out the argument in terms of legislative bicameralism. The common claim that rules matter, combined with the assumption that party members care about the clarity and content of party labels, leads directly to the overarching hypothesis that parties' internal structure and process should take account of opportunities available to their members to represent their own preferences as those of their party.

To highlight the key differences between unilateral and shared decision making, we sketch the agenda-setting portion of a party-positioning game between decision makers and their legislative constituents.[5] We seek to analyze neither the party-positioning game *per se*, nor actual policy making, but rather whether and how the ability to influence voter perceptions of the party label via legislative activity and authority affects intraparty influence. Simply put, we are looking for a connection between legislative institutions and party organization.

We begin with a comparison of two simple cases: a single decision maker versus two decision makers. We treat the party rank and file, or segments of it, as leaders' constituencies and assume that leaders take account of their constituents' preferences in order to avoid setting party positions that would upset them. We contrast the interaction between the party leader and a publicly visible party agent with decision making by the party leader acting alone. The point is not that decisions are likely to be different (though they are), but rather that shared decision making creates problems that can be costly if ignored.

Single chamber, one decision maker

When there is only one decision maker, the game resembles the Romer-Rosenthal setter model. The party leader, *l*, proposes party position *b*, which in equilibrium the party caucus accepts in essence because it likes what *l* proposes.[6] The leader's utility is $u_l(b) = -d_l$, where $d_l = \|x_l - b\|$ is the distance from *l*'s ideal point x_l to *b*.

Single chamber, two decision makers

In any legislative chamber, many if not all parties put members in positions where at least part of their job is to represent their party to voters. Examples include designated spokespersons in specific issue areas and seats on important committees, as well as the more obvious offices, such as committee chairs, parliamentary-group leaders, chamber president, vice presidents, or secretaries, and (in parliamentary systems) Cabinet ministers. Adding a party agent to the position-setting process yields the sequence shown in Figure 1. After party leader *l* has set the party position, the party agent, *a*, takes action $\alpha \in \{b_l, b_a\}$, which yields party position $b = f(b_l, b_a) \in \{x : \nexists x \neq b \text{ s.t. } u_j(b) > u_j(x) \forall j = l, a\}$ —in words, on the $b_l - b_a$ contract curve. To keep the setup simple, *a* is subject neither to punishment at the leader-punishment stage, nor to *l*'s discipline.[7] Any public divergence between b_l and α not only moves the party position from b_l, but also damages voter confidence in the reliability of the party label by $\gamma \|b_l - \alpha\|$, where γ is essentially a measure of how observable to voters is the difference between b_l and α. The greater the divergence, the greater the damage to the party label. The payoffs to the party leader and the agent in the shared decision making case thus are, respectively, $u_l(b) = -d_l - \gamma \|b_l - \alpha\|$ and $u_a(b) = -d_a - \gamma \|b_l - \alpha\|$.

The key differences between single-leader party-position setting and shared party-

position setting by a leader and an agent are two. Most obviously, the two-player case includes a payoff to player *a*, who is absent from the single-player case. The second difference is in the addition of the $\gamma\|b_l - \alpha\|$ term to the leader's and the agent's payoffs. Of interest here are a) how the addition of the second player affects the party label as well as *l*'s initial efforts to set the party position, and b) the extent to which both leader and agent might benefit from adjusting internal *party* procedures to take account of *a*'s *legislative* position. Hence, the important moves are *l*'s initial proposal of b_l and *a*'s decision either to reiterate b_l, or to amend it by proposing b_a.

Figure 1 about here

Assuming full information and proceeding by backward induction, the party agent's decision to accept or amend the party position as established by the party leader depends on how his choice affects his payoffs. Responses of the party rank and file are not considered here (they would affect the outcome but not the logic of the game). The party leader, in turn, seeks to influence *a*'s action through her choice of b_l. The agent amends the party position by proposing b_a if doing so moves the party position far enough toward his own ideal point to offset (in his favor) the party-label costs he incurs by diverging from *l*'s offer—that is, if his ideal point is far enough from the initial offer that the new party position that results from a proposal of b_a is better for him, even taking account of the damage to the party label, than accepting the original offer. Formally, *a* offers b_a as long as $\|x_a - b_l\| > \gamma\|b_l - b_a\| + \|x_a - b\|b_a\|$.

If the agent amends the party position, he imposes a party-label cost on everyone in the party. Given this prospect, it behooves the party leader to set b_l such that *a* is better off not amending it—i.e., $\|x_a - b_l\| \leq \gamma\|b_l - b_a\| + \|x_a - b\|b_a\|$—and $u_l(b_l) \geq u_l(b)$. Such a strategic initial

offer leaves the party position no worse for the leader than if *a* had amended it (cf. Baron and Ferejohn 1989a; 1989b), but everybody in the party is better off because there is no damage to the party label due to divergence between party leader and party agent.

The truncated position-setting game sketched above leads to two initial conclusions. First, the position a party would take if it had a single leader is likely to be different from the position it would take with two (or more) decision makers. Second, the existence of an agent who can influence his party's position and voters' perceptions thereof constrains the party leader. A leader who attempts to stake out a party position too far from the agent's ideal point will end up with an amended position between her proposed position and the agent's ideal point. Moreover, the process of amending the party position damages the party label. Consequently, everyone in the party would be better off if the leader set the party position close enough to the agent's ideal point to make amendment unattractive. These direct implications confound measurement, however, as the observation (as long as the party label is valuable) is that the leader sets the party position, and the rest of the party supports it. To arrive at testable hypotheses, we extend the logic of our argument to the peculiarities of bicameral legislatures, replacing leader and agent with lower and upper chambers, and ask how parties might ameliorate the potential damage from intraparty conflict across chambers.

Two chambers

In a single chamber, the threat to party labels posed by differences in preferences among legislative party leaders and their agents can be kept to a minimum through careful application of discipline and by adapting intraparty decision making to internalize the preferences of agents (cf. Cox and McCubbins 1993). The organizational option is problematic across legislative chambers, however, because bicameralism insulates the decision makers in one chamber from their counterparts in the other (Rogers 2001). This makes members of different chambers

different from party representatives on legislative committees because, for instance, party leaders can replace or demote copartisan committee members within their own chamber (Damgaard 1995) but cannot punish or limit the influence of copartisans in the other chamber. From the perspective of a party caucus in one chamber, this makes their copartisans in the other chamber analogous to the party agent described above: what they say and do can affect the party's policy position and overall label, independent of the party's influence on enacted legislation.

If party members value the clarity of party labels, they should seek to avoid public intraparty disagreements across chambers. They might, for example, seek to establish a common party position through extraparliamentary bargaining (cf. Evans 2001; Evans and Oleszek 2001a). Because the ability to damage the party label provides leverage, the existence of a second chamber raises the possibility that some party members might gain more influence than their intraparty rank merits. If the party's overall position derives from the positions taken by its contingents in each chamber, any member who can influence her caucus's position can influence her party's position overall. In order to minimize intercameral differences between copartisan cohorts, it would be useful to make them all agents of the same principal.[8]

How can party members in different chambers be made agents of the same principal? As noted above, leaders do not have the tools to discipline party rank and file, much less each other, across chambers. Central party leaders also cannot dictate to legislators in either chamber any more easily than can the party leaders in the other chamber, all else equal. Where copartisans in both chambers owe their seats to the same principal—whether legislative leaders in one or (jointly) both chambers or non-legislative leaders in the party bureaucracy (cf. Katz and Mair 1994)—they are more likely to evince public agreement on issues that matter to that principal.[9] Hence, to ensure that all else is *not* equal party leaders need, to the extent possible, to keep a

tight grip on ballot access for members of both chambers.

Ballot access and party discipline

Why would parties focus on controlling who gets on the ballot rather than trying to change electoral rules or constitutional structures? In the first place, a party can change its internal structure and process whenever it wants, as long as relevant members agree. Changing constitutional rules is considerably more difficult. Electoral rules might be easier to change than constitutions, but (leaving aside collective-action problems in multiparty coalitions) why would a party that came to power under a given set of rules to want to tamper with those rules, all else constant (Boix 1999; and cf. Knight 1992)? In the second place, who controls ballot access controls politicians' careers (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; cf. Heller and Mershon 2008) and, consequently, gains powerful influence over their behavior.

Candidate-selection rules have important implications for the conduct and content of politics. As Gallagher (1988, 1-2) put it, "through recruitment, the party indirectly influences… the interests most likely to be heard." The more control high-level party leaders have over candidate selection, the better they can induce self-interested legislators to toe the party line. Party discipline should be looser, by contrast, in the absence such control (De Winter 1988, 15; see also Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999a; 1999b). In Belgium, for example, decentralized candidate-selection mechanisms prior to the 1960s led to party factionalization, and the institution of more centralized procedures went hand in hand with increased party discipline (De Winter 1988). We take this reasoning a step further and examine the relationship between institutions and candidate selection procedures, positing that putting candidate selection for both chambers into the hands of central party actors makes the party cohorts in each chamber agents of the party as a whole (cf. Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, ch. 2).

Next, parties in unicameral legislatures should evince less concern about candidate

selection as a tool for maintaining the party label, for two reasons. First, they already have resources to keep members in line within their own chamber. And second, they have no upper-chamber copartisans to worry about. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:

H1:   *Candidate selection procedures should be more centralized in bicameral systems than in unicameral systems.*

We now turn to subject this hypothesis to empirical testing.

3. The Real World: Data and Tests

We test our argument about the effect of bicameralism on party organization by looking at candidate-selection decentralization. The unit of analysis is the individual party, allowing for within-country variation. Our measure of candidate-selection centralization draws heavily on Janda's (1980; 1988) coding of candidate-selection procedures. Janda's scale is recognized in the candidate-selection literature (e.g., Tan 2000; Bille 2001; Lundell 2004) and is particularly suited to our argument because it incorporates not only *who* chooses candidates, but also *when*. We test our hypothesis in both cross-sectional and time-series–cross-sectional analyses. We include time-series analysis because, while candidate-selection centralization was constant for most parties most of the time, our dataset does capture eight changes.[10]

The candidate-selection centralization scale captures the degree of control that voters, local and national party members, and national party leaders have over the process (see Table 1). Less-centralized procedures allow more participation by voters and local-level party leaders in deciding on a party's candidates. A fully centralized procedure, by contrast, would allow neither voters nor local party leaders any influence. Further, a more centralized procedure would give the national organization ex-ante veto power over candidate selection, while a less centralized procedure would give ex-ante veto power to the local organization and members. Ex-ante veto power is key because whoever has it can block individuals they do not want to see elected even

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from being considered as possible candidates.

Table 1 about here

The most decentralized processes (coded as one) are cases are where no rules for selection exist, suggesting that the party has no control over who runs under its label. The most centralized procedures (coded as nine) are where the party executive chooses candidates unilaterally. It is of course possible that in at least some parties a lack of rules governing candidate selection reflects leaders' unfettered ability to select candidates as they wish. To the extent that such parties exist in our dataset and are coded as 1, when they should be coded as 9, the data are biased against our hypothesis: of the four parties coded as 1 in our dataset, three are in bicameral systems and only one is in a unicameral system.

The unit of analysis in our statistical models is party-year. We code candidate selection centralization for 987 observations on 66 political parties in 11 Western European democracies (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) from, for the most complete cases, 1972 to 1990.[11] We code specific parties' candidate selection procedures from Katz and Mair's (1992) comprehensive dataset of party rules in western democracies. For parties in bicameral systems, we were able to code candidate selection procedures for at least one chamber in Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, and both chambers in Austria.[12]

Four parties take a value of one: the Belgian Flemish Socialist Party (1972 to 1978), the Belgian Flemish Socialist Party in Belgium (1978 to 1989), the Belgian Socialist Party (1978 to 1989), and the Danish Progress Party (1974 to 1989). The Italian Social Movement (1972-1980) received the highest value of nine on the candidate-selection centralization scale. As can be seen

in Figure 2, the modal category is 2. Most parties allow local party members to select candidates, which are then ratified by local party leaders.

Figure 3 provides a first cut at differentiating between unicameral and bicameral systems. It compares the distribution of our dependent variable in unicameral and bicameral systems. The figure supports both facets of the hypothesis: bicameralism induces parties to adopt more centralized candidate-selection procedures, while parties in unicameral legislatures are less concered about candidate selection. Substantively, these histograms show that local party members and local party leaders tend to control candidate selection in unicameral systems (the modal category is 2, and no cases yield values greater than 6); in bicameral systems, by contrast leaders at the local and national levels control the process, and local members' involvement is limited (the modal category for bicameral systems is 6, and there are observations with the maximum value of 9).

Figure 2 about here

Given the nature of our dependent variable and the limitations of specific modeling approaches, we subject our hypothesis to a battery of tests so that one model's strengths can compensate for others' weaknesses. We are concerned about three problems in particular. First, our use of an ordinal dependent variable means that ordinary least squares (OLS) predictions might be out of bounds and could overstate the errors, leading to false negatives. Second, an ordered-probit model with a large number of categories for the dependent variable increases the risk of violating the parallel-regression assumption, resulting in inaccurate estimates for the coefficients of the right-hand side variables. And finally, as is common for time series, there is the potential for positive correlation between observations within each party over time as well as among parties within each country.

Figure 3 about here

Since there are no real fixes for either the out-of-bounds errors problem or violations of the parallel regression assumption, we simply run both models. Furthermore, to account for intraparty correlation, we clustered by party—which allows us to account for correlation, but does not allow us to tell the model how certain observations are correlated. This is the purview of cross-sectional time-series generalized estimating equation (GEE) models. We therefore also estimated a GEE model assuming one-year autocorrelated errors to analyze the effect path dependency on the selection of procedures (meaning that observations from t-1 were related to observations in time t; for a more technical discussion of the model, see Zorn 2001; 2006). Last, to account for within-country correlation, we ran five cross-sectional OLS models, clustered by country. In sum, we tested our hypothesis using four different types of models—OLS (either clustered by party or country), ordered probit (with clustering by party or country), and GEE (assuming an AR1 process).

As noted, the independent variable of interest is *Bicameralism*. We run our tests with two distinct measures, first with a dummy (0 = unicameral, 1 = bicameral) and again using our own index of bicameralism (see Section 4). We expect the coefficient for *Bicameralism* to be positive. To reiterate, candidate selection should be more centralized in bicameral systems.

In order to ensure that our results are not driven by some other explanation identified in studies of candidate selection, we control for a number of additional factors. The most obvious is constitutional or legal constraints or requirements that force candidate-selection decentralization, which apply in three countries in our data—Finland, Norway, and the former West Germany (Gallagher 1988, 257). We thus include a dummy variable for *Legal Restrictions* (1 if restrictions exist and 0 otherwise). We expect the coefficient of *Legal Restrictions* to be negative. This

variable does not change for any country in our dataset. Parties either always face restrictions, or never do.[13]

Federalism has also been identified as affecting candidate selection. Parties in federal systems should be decentralized, since federal parties need to establish strong local branches in order to coordinate across subnational units (Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999a; 1999b; De Winter 1988; Gallagher and Marsh 1988). We control for this institutional factor using a dummy variable, *Federal*, coded 1 for federal systems and 0 for unitary systems on the basis of data from Lijphart (1999). Arguments in the literature suggest that the coefficient for *Federal* should be negative.

The relative size of bicameral legislative chambers also might influence candidate-selection centralization. The larger the upper chamber relative to the lower, the more opportunities exist for defection in the upper chamber. Parties may choose more centralized candidate selection procedures as the relative size of the upper chamber increases in order to prevent a large number of opportunistic legislators from entering the upper chamber. We control for this possibility with a *Relative Size of Chambers* variable (the ratio of total upper-chamber to lower-chamber seats, coded as 0 for unicameral legislatures). Data for this variable, which we expect to take a positive coefficient, are from the Institutions and Elections Database Project (Regan, Frank, and Clark 2009). We control for the total number of seats in the legislature as well, for the same reason. We expect a positive coefficient for *Total Number of Seats* (the sum of seats in all legislative chambers; data from Regan, Frank, and Clark 2009).

We further control for two party-specific factors. First, Tan (2004) suggests that (mass-membership) party size could affect candidate selection procedures. The larger a party the harder it should be to control its members, due to the likelihood of increased diversity among party

members and potential collective dilemmas within the party. To compensate, larger parties should adopt more centralized candidate-selection procedures. Of course, there might be decreasing marginal returns from increased centralization, suggesting a log-linear relationship (Tan 2000). To address this, we use membership data from Katz and Mair (1992) to construct a *Number of Members (log)* variable, for which we expect a positive coefficient.

Second, we control for party *Ideology*. To this end, we use data from the "Programmatic Dimensions" variable (the left-right scale, or RILE) from the *Comparative Manifesto Project* (CMP; Budge et al. 2001). If a given party-year was unavailable, we used information from the closest preceding year. Negative values in the data indicate left parties, while positive values indicate right parties. The conventional wisdom that left parties are more centralized than right parties (Tan 2000, 58-59) suggests that this variable should be negative.

Table 2 about here

Table 2 shows the results of the cross-sectional–time-series models using the bicameralism dummy. The coefficient for *Bicameralism* is uniformly positive and statistically significant. The results for the control variables were mixed. *Total Number of Seats*, *Federal*, *Legal Restrictions*, and *Ideology* conformed to expectations, but *Relative Size of Chambers* and *Number of Members* did not. These results support our argument that party candidate selection should be more centralized in bicameral than unicameral systems.

For our cross-sectional models (OLS , clustered by country), we randomly selected five years with more than forty-five observations each, yielding 1973, 1979, 1981, 1983, and 1988. We report only the results of the coefficients and standard errors for *Bicameralism* for each year (Table 3). For both the bivariate and full models, our key independent variable, *Bicameralism*, was positive and significant, as expected, at the .05 level in all but the 1973 bivariate model.

Table 3 about here

4. Extension: Accounting for Asymmetry

Our basic argument suggests that candidate selection procedures should be more centralized in bicameral systems than unicameral ones, irrespective of the relative importance of each chamber in the legislative process. Here, we discuss why the strength of upper lower chambers relative to lower ones also should matter. We are in effect taking seriously—albeit with respect to party positioning rather than legislative outputs—Lijphart's (1984) claim that bicameralism should matter more (given a degree of intercameral incongruence) where chambers are relatively symmetric. The more influence an upper chamber has over outcomes, the more attention voters will pay to it. This should encourage party leaders to take more control over which members occupy in each chamber.

To account for how the relative strength of an upper chamber affects the ability of its members to move their party labels, recall the formal model from Section 2. After the party leader has set her party's position, the party agent takes action $\alpha \in \{b_l, b_a\}$. Any public divergence between b_l and α blurs the party label; how blurry it gets depends on $\gamma \in [0,1]$, where γ essentially is a measure of how much attention voters pay to the agent's (in this case, the party's membership in each chamber) actions.

To reiterate, party leaders in bicameral systems ought to be concerned about the possibility that their copartisans in different chambers might take different policy positions, thus blurring the party label. The extent of that concern, however, depends at least in part on how much attention voters pay to each chamber. The more powerful the upper chamber is relative to the lower, we believe, the more attention voters will pay to it and its members. This attention provides upper-chamber members leverage to affect voter perceptions of their parties' labels,

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which in turn should increase party leaders' interest in who sits in that chamber. Backbenchers should care as well, inasmuch as they all suffer when their party label is weak. It follows that party leaders and rank-and-file alike are more likely to prefer centralized party control over candidate selection, all else equal, the more policy authority the upper chamber has. This discussion leads to our second hypothesis.

H2: Candidate selection procedures should become more centralized as the relative importance of an upper chamber increases.

We test H2 using the same models as in Section 3, substituting an index variable for the *Bicameralism* dummy. *Bicameralism Index*, a comparative measure of the strength of an upper chamber relative to its lower chamber counterpart, ranges from 0 to 1 (0 for unicameral, 1 for essentially co-equal chambers). We expect the coefficient of the index to be positive: that is, the more symmetric the chambers, the more centralized candidate selection should be.

We constructed the index from national constitutions (and secondary sources where necessary) by answering a series of questions about each chamber's powers.[14] We coded the answers as 1 ("yes") or 0 ("no"). In each category of questions, we calculated a statistic to reflect the authority of the upper chamber relative to the lower. The formula varies for each category depending on the number and nature of the questions in it. We thus set the selection-rule statistic to 0 if both chambers have the same selection rule and 1 if selection rules are distinct; where selection rules differ partially, e.g., where both chambers are selected by proportional representation, but the upper chamber has appointed or life members as well, the statistic is 0.5 (cf. Lijphart 1984; McCarty and Cutrone 2006). Finally, we summed the calculated statistics for each category and divided by the maximum score, yielding the index shown in Table 4.

Table 4 about here

Tables 5 and 6 show the results from replacing the *Bicameralism* dummy variable with our *Bicameralism Index* measure. As can be seen, the results are substantively identical to those shown in Tables 2 and 3 for the dummy. These estimations are consistent with our more nuanced argument that parties not only respond to bicameralism by centralizing candidate selection, but also that they should be more prone to do so the more visible their upper-chamber cohorts are. Consistent with the presumption that upper chambers are more visible the more influence they have in the legislative process, the data suggest that parties in systems with relatively strong upper chambers have more centralized candidate selection procedures than parties where chamber powers are more asymmetric.

<div align="center">Table 5 about here</div>

<div align="center">Table 6 About here</div>

5. Conclusion

Our goals in this paper were two. Substantively, we set out to show that parties organize differently in different institutional contexts. Specifically, we have demonstrated that legislative bicameralism is associated with centralization of parties' procedures for selecting candidates to legislative office. On the theoretical side, we showed that institutional analysis can usefully be extended to examine not simply relationships between institutional structures and policy (or political) outcomes, but also to focus on how institutions create opportunities and hence structure incentives.

We build our argument on the assumption of policy-motivated politicians (and voters), but our approach allows for ascribing other motivations to politicians as well. Ambitious politicians adapt to institutional structure and process over which they have little control by manipulating institutions, such as party organizations, that they *can* control. The logic of our argument thus should apply in other venues, e.g., party groups in the European Parliament, the

relationship between legislative rules and constitutional institutions, the existence and salience of party factions (cf. Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies 1999; 2000), or, in non-parliamentary systems, the ability of presidents to construct legislative support coalitions (cf. Haggard and McCubbins 2001; Samuels and Shugart 2010).

Our approach both allows a more nuanced perspective for understanding the effects of institutional design and finesses one of the principal and most challenging problems with the empirical study of institutions: institutions structure behavior, but if they work their effects are invisible. Comparative statics in most cases offer little solace to the researcher, precisely because *observed* behavior does not change. Examining organization rather than behavior, however, does yield observable implications of institutional structure, at least in the case of bicameralism. Examining organizations comparatively provides useful leverage for examining how political actors adapt to rules that they cannot easily change.

That organizational adaptation to institutional structure is in some sense a secondary effect of institutions, where the effect of institutional design on policy outcomes would be the primary effect, does not make it unimportant. On the contrary, if copartisans differ with respect to what they think those goals should be or the strategic and tactical choices they would make in trying to achieve their party's goals, then the positions that parties take and how they implement them depend fundamentally on how they organize. Squaring the circle, legislative and constitutional institutions affect legislative party systems; hence they affect not only policy outcomes but also the choices offered to voters. It is therefore important to examine institutions in context—not just cultural and historical context, but in terms of what other institutions exist (and how amenable they are to change) and how policy-motivated actors can use organization at one level to adapt to institutional structure at another.

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   *Political Research Quarterly* 59(3), 329-341.

Figure 1: Setting Party Policy, Two Decision Makers

Table 1: Coding for centralization of party candidate-selection procedures

| Code	Criterion
1	There are no criteria for selecting candidates.
2	Nominations are determined locally by vote of party members and ratified by local leaders.
3	Selection is made by local party leaders and must then be ratified in some way by local party members.
4	Selection is made by local leaders with little or no participation by other party members.
5	Selection is made locally by party members or leaders and must be approved by the national organization.
6	Selection is made is made by local leaders only and must be approved by the national organization.
7	Selection is made by the national organization, but selections must be approved by local or affiliated organizations.
8	Selection is made by a national party congress or caucus. This decision may or may not be approved by the national executive.
9	Selection is made by an executive party council.

Figure 2: Candidate selection procedures, all countries

Figure 3: Candidate selection centralization by number of chambers

Table 2: Bicameralism and Candidate-Selection Centralization (bicameralism dummy)

	Ordered Probit		OLS		GEE	
Dependent Variable: Candidate Centralization						
(Standard errors in parentheses)						
Bicameralism	0.810***	1.459***	1.450***	1.8809**	1.616***	2.213***
	(0.261)	(0.445)	(0.435)	(0.600)	(0.472)	(0.553)
Relative Size of Chambers		-2.228***		-2.995***		-2.774***
		(0.604)		(0.875)		(0.793)
Total Number of Seats		0.002***		0.003***		0.002***
		(0.000)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Federal		0.401		0.809*		0.518
		(0.334)		(0.464)		(0.425)
Legal Restrictions		-1.542***		-2.141***		-2.156***
		(0.345)		(0.409)		(0.443)
Number of Members (log)		0.010		-0.012		-0.005
		(0.045)		(0.069)		(0.034)
Ideology		-0.005		-0.007		-0.002*
		(0.005)		(0.007)		(0.001)
Constant			3.164***	3.238***	3.066***	3.118***
			(0.345)	(0.705)	(0.408)	(0.482)
Cut point 1	-1.189	-1.322				
	(0.276)	(0.548)				
Cut point 2	0.023	0.070				
	(0.218)	(0.480)				
Cut point 3	0.264	0.395				
	(0.209)	(0.473)				
Cut point 4	0.402	0.574				
	(0.212)	(0.460)				
Cut point 5	1.123	1.496				
	(0.234)	(0.511)				
Cut point 6	2.230	2.858				
	(0.301)	(0.622)				
Cut point 7	2.975	3.643				
	(0.377)	(0.638)				
Cut point 8	3.087	3.779				
	(0.431)	(0.642)				
N	987	987	987	987	987	987
R^2/ Pseudo R^2	0.0328	0.1387	0.1224	0.4281		
Prob. Chi > 0	0.0019	0.0000			0.0006	0.0000
Prob. F > 0			0.0014	0.0000		
*p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001*						

Table 3: Bicameralism Dummy, Cross-Sectional Models

	Dependent Variable: Candidate Centralization	
	Bicameralism Dummy Coefficients (Standard Errors in Parentheses)	
Year	**Bivariate**	**Full Model**
1973	1.293 (0.946)	1.480* (0.652)
1979	1.450* (0.688)	1.900* (0.925)
1981	1.325* (0.673)	1.698* (0.826)
1983	1.238* (0.653)	1.783* (0.793)
1988	1.410* (0.679)	2.079* (0.768)
*$p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$*		

Table 4: Bicameralism Index

Country	Period	Bicameralism index
Austria	1975-1987	0.48
Austria	1988-1990	0.46
Belgium	1972-1989	0.67
Denmark	1972-1989	0
Finland	1972-1990	0
Germany	1972-1989	0.67
Ireland	1973-1990	0.45
Italy	1972-1990	1
Netherlands	1972-1983	0.76
Netherlands	1984-1989	0.81
Norway	1972-1990	0.65
Sweden	1975-1989	0
UK	1972-1989	0.52

Table 5: Bicameralism and Candidate-Selection Centralization (bicameralism index)

	Ordered Probit		OLS		GEE	
	Dependent Variable: Candidate Centralization					
	(Standard errors in parentheses)					
Bicameralism Index	1.167***	1.316**	2.058***	1.763**	2.107***	2.039***
	(0.326)	(0.440)	(0.512)	(0.594)	(0.579)	(0.649)
Relative Size of Chambers		-1.526**		-2.151**		-1.826**
		(0.556)		(0.816)		(0.731)
Total Number of Seats		0.001**		0.002**		0.002**
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Federal		0.548*		1.017**		0.715*
		(0.308)		(0.425)		(0.428)
Legal Restrictions		-1.284***		-1.869***		-1.858***
		(0.277)		(0.355)		(0.436)
Number of Members (log)		0.009		-0.011		-0.007
		(0.047)		(0.075)		(0.036)
Left Party		-0.005		-0.006		-0.002*
		(0.005)		(0.007)		(0.001)
Constant			3.181***	3.446***	3.194***	3.437***
			(0.328)	(0.751)	(0.359)	(0.481)
Cut point 1	-1.208	-1.440				
	(0.271)	(0.550)				
Cut point 2	0.014	-0.091				
	(0.217)	(0.486)				
Cut point 3	0.260	0.224				
	(0.209)	(0.479)				
Cut point 4	0.399	0.397				
	(0.207)	(0.466)				
Cut point 5	1.129	1.286				
	(0.234)	(0.496)				
Cut point 6	2.278	2.597				
	(0.336)	(0.613)				
Cut point 7	3.009	3.374				
	(0.321)	(0.602)				
Cut point 8	3.134	3.517				
	(0.383)	(0.611)				
N	987	987	987	987	987	987
R^2/ Pseudo R^2	0.0400	0.1216	0.1464	0.3962		
Prob. Chi > 0	0.0004	0.0000			0.0003	0.0000
Prob. F > 0			0.0001	0.0000		
*p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001*						

Table 6: Bicameralism Index, cross sectional models

Dependent Variable: Candidate Centralization		
	Bicameralism Index Coefficients (Standard Errors in Parentheses)	
Year	**Bivariate**	**Full Model**
1973	2.275* (1.109)	1.413* (0.704)
1979	2.050** (0.706)	1.955* (1.075)
1981	1.814* (0.719)	1.445 (0.807)
1983	1.726* (0.743)	1.571* (0.821)
1988	1.989* (0.788)	1.904* (0.747)
*$p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$*		

[1] In our discussion here, we treat party structure as a product of choice. It could, however, just as easily be a product of evolutionary pressures, in the sense that parties with structures that permit too much degradation of their labels fail to survive over time (cf. Alchian 1950).

[2] We focus on ballot access because it highlights an actor's ability to speak for a party. Other tools exist alongside ballot access as components of party discipline; if they render ballot access irrelevant, however, our tests would not support our claims.

[3] Other such obstacles to party-label clarity include regional legislatures and municipal governments (interviews with Torsten Schack Pedersen, Danish Liberal party, and Helge Adam Møller, Danish Conservative party, 3 June 2009).

[4] Party leaders and backbenchers in Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, and the Netherlands interviewed in February-March and May-June 2009 all agreed that party unity is an important consideration underpinning intraparty decisions.

[5] The full game among party rank and file, leaders, and agents, is beyond the scope of this paper.

[6] The proposal need not maximize anyone's utility. After the leader sets the party position, each member chooses to cooperate or to resist (cf. the "whipping game" in Laver 1999); resistance does not alter the position set by the leader, but it does damage the party label. After backbenchers respond to the leader's positioning choice, the leader can impose a disciplinary cost on some or all of them, but incurs a cost for doing so. Finally, party members choose whether to seek to punish the leader. A leader whose ideal point is anything but central relative to backbencher ideal points thus would not simply offer her own ideal point.

[7] This kind of freedom from punishment does occur in the real world. For example, a chamber president can serve a different majority than the government (as was often the case in Italy from

the early 1970s to the mid 1990s). In a bicameral legislature, of course, members of one chamber cannot discipline members of the other.

[8] In principle, all parties and legislators are agents of voters. Voters, however, are hardly in a position to induce individual legislators or chamber party contingents to toe the same party line.

[9] One reasonable intuition is that party organizations (as opposed to chamber caucuses) should be stronger in bicameral than in unicameral systems. This possibility, while beyond the scope of this paper, is fodder for future research.

[10] The Belgian Christian People's Party changes from a 5 to 6 in 1989; the Belgian Party of Liberty and Progress changes from a 5 to a 2 in 1982; the Danish Center Democrats changes from a 3 to 5 in 1978; the Danish Liberal Party changes from a 4 to 3 in 1973; the Finnish People's Democratic League changes from a 2 to 5 in 1978; the Italian Social Movement Party changes from a 9 to 6 in 1981; the Italian Radical Party changes from a 4 to 6 in 1980; and the Norwegian Labor Party changes from a 5 to 4 in 1981. It is worth noting as well that the absence of changes should not be taken as evidence that changes were not possible. Indeed, parties do change their candidate-selection procedures—we found some 41 changes in candidate-selection procedure that did not affect their centralization for the parties and time period covered by our data—and that they do not revisit centralization in particular suggests that they did not need to.

[11] We exclude the United States because legal restrictions on party candidate selection vary by state, and our control variable for the number of party members means something different in the US from most other countries. We nevertheless ran the analysis with the US to check the stability of our results. We coded all US parties as "2" and counted as party "members" all who voted for that party's candidate in the previous presidential election. *Bicameralism* and *Bicameralism Index* were significant in most of the models.

[12] Most parties in bicameral systems in our dataset had members in both chambers at some point in the time series. We did identify four parties that did not have members in both chambers, one from Austria (the Freedom Party, coded as a 6 on the candidate selection scale) and three from Ireland (the Worker's Party, the Green Party, and the Progressive Democrats, coded as 5, 5, and 1, respectively).

[13] To provide a tougher test for our analysis, we ran all our models without the *Legal Restrictions* variable. The results for *Bicameralism* changed in the ordered probit and OLS models, but stayed the same in the GEE cross-sectional–time-series models. In addition, the results for *Bicameralism Index* variable changed in the OLS model, but stayed the same in the order probit and GEE cross-sectional–time-series models. Last, when we included US parties without controlling for legal restrictions, for most models *Bicameralism* and the *Bicameralism Index* were insignificant.

[14] Coding criteria are available upon request. Also, our focus on formal institutions builds on idea that when rules matter they should be invisible. Institutions generally are noticeable only when they are not working well or if those they endow with authority believe they can benefit from flexing their institutional muscles (as when different parties control different legislative chambers, for instance). Because we are analyzing interactions within rather than between parties, this latter circumstance is irrelevant.